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“Damages or Nothing”: The Post-Boumediene
Constitution and Compensation for Human Rights
Violations after 9/11
*

Elizabeth A. Wilson

Since 9/11, the lower U.S. federal courts and the Supreme
Court have decided a series of damages cases implicating national
1
security.
These cases have sought monetary compensation for
persons injured as a result of detention, abuse, and alleged torture in
the course of the United States’ “war on terrorism” and have involved
a range of plaintiffs that, in terms of status, fall on a continuum
ranging from “insiders” (U.S. citizens detained inside the United
States, even as “enemy combatants”) to “borderline” cases
(unauthorized aliens within the United States or inadmissible aliens
turned away at the border) to total “outsiders” (aliens detained
outside the United States without ever entering the country). For the
purposes of this Article, this continuum will be called “the continuum
*

Assistant Professor of Human Rights Law and Public International Law, Seton
Hall University, Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations.
1
This Article examines ten damages cases. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937
(2009) (requiring unauthorized alien detained in the United States to plead more
specific facts before permitting Bivens remedy to go forward); Rasul v. Myers, 563
F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir.)(deciding against Bivens remedy for former Guantánamo
detainees on qualified immunity grounds and, as an alternative, on special factor of
national security), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1013 (2009); Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d
949 (9th Cir. 2009)(finding former attorney general not entitled to immunity from
Bivens suit for devising policy under material witness statute that resulted in U.S.
citizen’s detention on suspicion of terrorism-related activities), cert. granted 131 S. Ct.
415 (2010), rev’d 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011); Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157 (2d Cir.
2008)(denying Bivens remedy on national security grounds to “inadmissible” alien
apprehended while in transit at John F. Kennedy International Airport, detained in
the United States, and ultimately rendered to Syria where he was tortured), aff’d en
banc, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009); El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 302 (4th
Cir 2007); Vance v. Rumsfeld, 694 F. Supp. 2d 957 (N.D. Ill. 2010); Al-Zahrani v.
Rumsfeld, 684 F. Supp. 2d 103, 106 (D.D.C. 2010); Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d
1005 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (permitting Bivens suit to go forward against former Office of
Legal Counsel lawyer who crafted legal authorization for torture of a U.S. citizen);
Kar v. Rumsfeld, 580 F. Supp. 2d 80, 81–82 (D.D.C. 2008); In re Iraq & Afg. Detainees
Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 85 (D.D.C. 2007))(denying Bivens remedy to detainees held in
military custody in Iraq and Afghanistan), aff’d sub nom. Ali v. Rumsfeld, No. 07-5178,
(D.C. Cir. June 21, 2011).
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of rights” and the damages actions under discussion the “9/11
damages cases.”
Though it has been argued that the outcomes in at least some of
these cases can be explained by reference to the “subterranean
2
impact of immigration law,” it is of course more correct to say that all
of these cases, and the fundamental logic of immigration law itself,
are shaped by the doctrine of strict territoriality with respect to aliens
3
as previously stated in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez and Johnson v.
4
Eisentrager. In constitutional law, strict territoriality means that the
U.S. Constitution applies only to the territories under the sovereign
5
control of the United States. Verdugo-Urquidez and Eisentrager
expressed the doctrine in terms of a continuum of “voluntary
contacts,” or sliding “scale,” reflecting the degree to which the alien
in question has willingly affiliated himself or herself with the United
6
States and subjected himself or herself to its laws. Though the
continuum is gradual, with gradations of rights at either end, it
contains a divide located on the “water’s edge” of U.S. territory.
7
Until the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Boumediene v. Bush,
aliens abroad without prior substantial connections to the United
States could not lay claim to the protections of the U.S. Constitution
beyond this divide. The Court in Boumediene breached this divide for
the first time with respect to aliens, by holding that detainees in U.S.
custody at the Guantánamo Bay Detention Center had a
8
constitutional right to habeas corpus. With this landmark decision,
a majority of the Court embraced the doctrine of “contextual due
process” developed in prior concurrences by Justice Anthony
Kennedy. The decision gave rise to optimism on the part of those
who have long advocated for detainee rights. But although it
dislodged the habeas corpus litigation stayed in the district courts,
2

Juliet P. Stumpf, The Implausible Alien: Iqbal and the Influence of Immigration Law,
14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231 (2010).
3
494 U.S. 259 (1990).
4
339 U.S. 763 (1950).
5
The territoriality doctrine derives from jurisdictional principles under
international law.
6
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271 (finding that the Fourth Amendment has no
application in the search of an alien’s home located in a foreign country); Eisentrager,
339 U.S. at 770–71. For a criticism of the test created by Verdugo-Urquidez, see Jeffrey
Kahn, Zoya’s Standing Problem, Or, When Should the Constitution Follow the Flag?, 108
MICH. L. REV. 673, 676 (2010) (arguing that Verdugo-Urquidez created a prudential
standing test that “is inconsistent with any theoretical view of the Constitution’s
extraterritoriality”).
7
553 U.S. 723 (2008).
8
Id. at 798.
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Boumediene has so far had no appreciable effect on damages cases.
Indeed, the current Court is perceived to be hostile even to damages
claims resting on the Constitution even when brought by U.S.
citizens. Boumediene thus represents a breakthrough, but its precise
implications are not yet clear.
The divide located at the center of the continuum of rights goes
a long way to explaining the 9/11 damages cases. U.S. citizens and
aliens—legal and illegal—located within the physical territory of the
United States have had the greatest success bringing damages claims,
while aliens abroad have had virtually no success bringing such
9
claims. In terms of the degree of injury involved, however, the
damage cases have been decided inconsistently. In some cases
involving egregious acts of torture and abuse occurring over
extended periods of time, the plaintiffs have been barred from
pursuing their claims, while some cases involving less serious acts
10
have gone forward or settled. Even worse, the success or failure of
the claims bears no relation to the actual innocence of the plaintiffs.
This Article reviews the 9/11 damages cases for the light they
shed on the post-Boumediene Constitution. Part I describes the
contextual due process standard adopted by a majority of the
Supreme Court in Boumediene. Part II sets out the basic structure of
constitutional torts damages actions. Part III provides an overview of
the 9/11 damages cases, highlights salient features, and locates each
on the continuum of rights. Part IV analyzes what these cases tell us
about the direction that constitutional jurisprudence regarding
extraterritoriality will likely take in the future.
I.

THE CONTEXTUAL DUE PROCESS STANDARD

The litigation involving the question of whether detainees in
Guantánamo Bay were entitled to the writ of habeas corpus provided
Justice Kennedy with two opportunities to refine the “contextual due
process” standard that he had first begun to outline in a concurrence
11
in the 1990 case of United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez. The first habeas
petitions filed on behalf of Guantánamo detainees raised a number
of constitutional claims, and the lower federal courts dismissed them
9

Compare Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2009), with Rasul v.
Rumsfeld, 414 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C. 2006).
10
See infra Part III.
11
494 U.S. 259, 278 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354
U.S. 1, 75)(“[T]he question of which specific safeguards . . . are appropriately to be
applied in a particular context . . . can be reduced to the issue of what process is
‘due’ a defendant in the particular circumstances of a particular case.”).
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for lack of jurisdiction, treating the statutory reach of the writ as
12
coextensive with its constitutional reach. In Rasul v. Bush, decided
13
in 2004, the Supreme Court held that the federal habeas statute
extended to Guantánamo Bay by virtue of the United States’
“exclusive jurisdiction and control” over the territory on which the
14
military base was located. While not finding it necessary to reach
the question of whether the Constitution provided an alternative
ground for jurisdiction, the Supreme Court intimated in a footnote
that the Court might be willing to reconsider its earlier decisions
setting down a bright-line rule that aliens abroad could not avail
15
themselves of the protections of the Constitution. Justice Kennedy,
concurring, found that the question required “an initial inquiry into
the general circumstances of the detention to determine whether the
Court has the authority to entertain the petition and to grant relief
16
after considering all of the facts presented.”
After Rasul, the focus of the Guantánamo detainee litigation
then turned to the question of whether the detainees had any
affirmative rights to vindicate. In a case deciding an early set of
consolidated issues, Judge Joyce Hens Green of the District Court for
the District of Columbia stated that she was following Justice
Kennedy’s methodology in holding that detainees could claim the
17
protection of the Fifth Amendment. A holding by Judge Richard
18
Leon reached a contrary result. While the two decisions were on
appeal, Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA),
stripping the federal courts of jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions
19
filed under the federal habeas statute. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the
Supreme Court held that Congress had not clearly expressed its
20
intention to make the DTA retroactive. In response to Hamdan,
12

See Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“We cannot
see why, or how, the writ [28 U.S.C. § 2241] may be made available to aliens abroad
when basic constitutional protections are not.”); Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 65
(D.D.C. 2002)(not clearly distinguishing the statutory and constitutional grounds for
dismissal).
13
The federal habeas statute requires prisoners in custody of the United States to
be released if they can show that they are being held in violation of the “Constitution
or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2006).
14
542 U.S. 466, 482 n. 15 (2004)
15
Id.
16
Id. at 487 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
17
In re Guantánamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 463–64 (D.D.C. 2005).
18
Khalid v. Bush, 355 F.Supp.2d 311, 322–23 (D.D.C. 2005).
19
Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e), 119 Stat. 2680, 2742 (codified at 10 U.S.C. §
801 (2006)).
20
548 US 557 (2006).
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Congress passed the Military Commissions Act (MCA), in which it
made clear its intention to strip retroactively the federal courts of
22
jurisdiction to hear habeas cases. The MCA turned the focus of the
litigation back to jurisdiction and to the question of whether the
federal courts had power to hear habeas petitions brought from
Guantánamo. This was the question presented to the Supreme Court
23
and decided in 2008 in Boumediene v. Bush.
In a majority opinion written by Justice Kennedy, the Supreme
Court in Boumediene invalidated Section 7 of the MCA as a violation of
24
the Suspension Clause.
Much of Boumediene is devoted to the
reasoning underlying the holding; the holding itself, however, is fairly
succinct:
[W]e conclude that at least three factors are relevant in
determining the reach of the Suspension Clause: (1) the
citizenship and status of the detainee and the adequacy of the
process through which that status determination was made; (2)
the nature of the sites where apprehension and then detention
took place; and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving
25
the prisoner’s entitlement to the writ.

Justice Kennedy then applied these factors to the cases before him
and concluded that detainees held in U.S. custody at Guantánamo
26
were entitled to the writ of habeas corpus. Particularly important
factors in his determination included the inadequacy of the process
through which the status determinations of the detainees had
originally been made, the absolute and indefinite control that the
United States exerts over Guantánamo Bay, the security of the naval
base, and the lack of potential friction with Cuba resulting from
27
proceedings in U.S. courts.
Justice Kennedy first examined the history of habeas corpus
28
before the adoption of the Suspension Clause. He then turned to
the constitutional methodology and outlined a case-by-case,
21

Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified as
amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a–50w (2006) and in other scattered sections of 10 and
18 U.S.C.).
22
Id. at Sec. 7 (codified at 28 U.S.C. 2241(e)(1)).
23
After several rounds of briefing, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia denied jurisdiction in early 2007. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 994
(2007), rev’d 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
24
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 795, 798.
25
Id. at 776.
26
Id. at 771.
27
Id. at 767–71.
28
Id. at 739–53.
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provision-by-provision standard regarding the application of the U.S.
Constitution to territories over which the U.S. government exerts
29
control but not sovereignty. Whether the Constitution constrains
the actions of the U.S. government abroad—both with respect to
citizens and aliens, it would seem—is now subject to a functional,
30
rather indeterminate test. A court considering the question must
examine the ‘“particular circumstances, the practical necessities, and
the possible alternatives which Congress had before it’” and, in
particular, whether judicial enforcement of the provision would be
31
‘“impracticable and anomalous.’”
Boumediene thus opened a small fissure in the strict territoriality
doctrine, through which other rights beyond the Suspension Clause
might conceivably flow.
II. STRUCTURE OF DAMAGES SUITS
While the habeas litigation was ongoing, individual suits for
damages related to post-9/11 detention and torture commenced. In
comparison with the habeas litigation, the damages actions have been
isolated and scattershot. In addition to stripping the federal courts of
jurisdiction to hear habeas claims, the MCA stripped the courts of
jurisdiction
to hear or consider any other action against the United States or
its agents relating to any aspect of the detention, transfer,
treatment, trial, or conditions of confinement of an alien who is
or was detained by the United States and has been determined by
the United States to have been properly detained as an enemy
32
combatant or is awaiting such determination.

This jurisdictional bar has limited the number of eligible plaintiffs.
The suits that have not been barred have a common structure.
Whether brought by citizens or aliens, all of the 9/11 damages cases
involve three basic analytical components: a) determination of an
underlying right and/or cause of action, b) assertion of defenses
related to questions of immunity, and c) use of the ancillary state
33
secrets doctrine.
Those three basic components do not always
occur in the same sequence, and a particular case may not include all
three.

29
30
31
32
33

See generally id.
See Boumediene, 553 U.S. 723.
Id. at 759.
28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(2)(2006).
See infra Part II.C.
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Since a Bivens action presupposes a constitutional right, and
qualified immunity requires that the right be clearly established,
damages cases reveal the underlying constitutional jurisprudence at
several stages of the litigation. A court may decide that the plaintiff
has no cause of action because she is not entitled to the protections
of the U.S. Constitution.
The Supreme Court has signaled
ambivalence about the Bivens doctrine almost since the moment it
created the doctrine in 1973 and has recently stated that Bivens
34
should not be extended to “new contexts.” Federal courts find it
easy to dismiss damages cases on qualified immunity grounds when
the plaintiffs are aliens and the relevant acts occurred abroad. Even
though the Supreme Court has held that detainees at Guantánamo
Bay have a constitutional right to habeas corpus, the government has
successfully argued that that right was not clearly established when
the events took place. In addition, the U.S. government has been
quicker to invoke the state secrets privilege when the plaintiffs are
aliens and the claims arise out of acts occurring abroad.
A. The Bivens Cause of Action
Generally, in a damages action, the first question to address is
whether plaintiffs have a cause of action. In the 9/11 damages cases,
plaintiffs typically have two alternatives: either the cause of action is
based directly on the U.S. Constitution or it is based on international
law—in which case the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) provides federal
35
courts with jurisdiction. This discussion focuses only on the Bivens
claims; owing to the structure of domestic U.S. immunity law, the
international law claims are effectively subordinate to the
36
constitutional claims.
A Bivens action enables a plaintiff to bring a direct constitutional
claim for damages, even where Congress has not created a cause of

34

Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 74 (2001).
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). U.S. citizen plaintiffs or alien plaintiffs present in the
United States when the abuse allegedly occurred usually bring Bivens claims only.
Plaintiffs who were outside the United States when the abuse allegedly occurred
usually bring both Bivens and ATS claims.
36
This subordination occurs because of the structure of the federal immunity
policy. In a suit against a federal officer in his personal capacity, unless the claimant
alleges a violation of a federal constitutional or statutory right, or unless the court
finds that the official has been acting outside of the scope of his employment, the
United States will automatically be substituted as defendant. 28 U.S.C. §1346(b),
§2679(b)(1). In cases arising in a foreign country, this substitution will result in
automatic dismissal. Id. §2680(k).
35
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37

action by statute. A violation of the U.S. Constitution does not,
however, automatically give rise to a Bivens cause of action. Bivens is a
judge-made remedy and, in recent years, the doctrine has been
increasingly narrowed by the Supreme Court. In order to determine
whether it is appropriate to create a Bivens remedy, courts use a twoprong test. First, the court must determine whether any alternative,
existing process for protecting the interest amounts to a convincing
reason for the judicial branch to refrain from providing a new and
38
freestanding remedy in damages; second, if no such process exists,
“‘the federal courts must make the kind of remedial determination
that is appropriate for a common-law tribunal, paying particular
heed, however, to any special factors counseling hesitation before
39
authorizing a new kind of federal litigation.’”
As a threshold
question, the court must ask whether “the petitioner asserts a
40
constitutionally protected right.” Accordingly, the existence of this
right is either assumed or assessed first.
Scholars and other Supreme Court watchers are generally of the
view that the Court has become increasingly hostile to Bivens actions,
41
cutting back the doctrine whenever possible. In Correctional Services
Corporation v. Malesko, the Court stated that Bivens should not be
42
extended to any “new context” or “new category of defendants.”
The meaning that the Supreme Court has given to “context” in its
43
jurisprudence has aptly been described as “less than clear.” A “new
context” could mean a new “cause of action.” Or, it could mean a
claim under another constitutional amendment. The Supreme
Court’s 2007 decision Wilkie v. Robbins suggests an understanding of
44
“context” as a “cause of action.”
Lower courts, however, have
interpreted Wilkie to mean that Bivens should not be extended to new

37
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 397 (1971).
38
Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007) (citing Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367,
378 (1983)).
39
Id. at 550 (quoting Lucas, 462 U.S. at 378).
40
Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 234 (1979).
41
See Joan Steinman, Backing off Bivens and the Ramifications of this Retreat for the
Vindication of First Amendment Rights, 83 MICH. L. REV. 269 (1984); Laurence H. Tribe,
Death by a Thousand Cuts: Constitutional Wrongs Without Remedies after Wilkie v. Robbins,
2007 CATO S. CT. REV. 23 (2007).
42
534 U.S. 61, 68 (2001) (“We have consistently refused to extend Bivens liability
to any new context or category of defendants.”).
43
Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 596–97 (2d Cir. 2009) (Sack, J., dissenting).
44
Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 555 (describing difficulty in “defining a workable cause of
action”).
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45

“situations” defined in a more “gestalt”-like sense. Two years after
Wilkie, in Iqbal v. Ashcroft, the Court seemed to incline to the meaning
46
of “context” as a claim under another amendment. In Iqbal, the
Court cast doubt on whether it would recognize a Bivens action under
the First Amendment, even though the Supreme Court had
previously fashioned Bivens actions under the Fourth, Fifth, and
47
Eighth Amendments.
In the 9/11 damages cases, the second Bivens prong has played
the most important role in judicial decisions. It is manifestly clear
that Congress has not yet created an alternative remedial scheme for
victims of 9/11 counterterrorism actions. There have been no highlevel prosecutions, no public apologies, and no compensation funds,
even in instances where the United States has admitted cases of
mistaken identity. As a result, victims of human rights violations in
the war on terrorism have been forced to pursue the route of civil
48
damages claims. While the distinction between the first and second
49
Bivens prongs is blurred and unclear in some Supreme Court cases,
45
For example, the Second Circuit in Arar described “extraordinary rendition” as
a new “context” and declined to recognize a Bivens remedy for a legal alien who was
detained in transit on U.S. territory. Arar, 585 F.3d at 572 (“[N]o court has
previously afforded a Bivens remedy for extraordinary rendition.”).
46
See 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (2009)
47
Id. But see Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006) (involving a Bivens claim
under the First Amendment for retaliatory prosecution). It currently seems well
settled among the lower courts that First Amendment violations give rise to a Bivens
cause of action. See, e.g., White v. Boyle, 538 F.2d 1077 (4th Cir. 1976); Paton v.
LaPrade, 524 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1975); Hostrop v. Bd. of Junior College Dist., 471
F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1972). In an earlier First Amendment case, Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S.
367 (1983), the Supreme Court held that the availability of a meaningful remedial
scheme precluded the fashioning of a Bivens remedy.
48
See, e.g., Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2009).
49
Consideration of an alternative remedial scheme was initially articulated as
part of a “special factors” analysis in Bivens itself. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396–97 (1971); see also Davis v.
Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 247–48 (1979). In Carlson v. Green, a case against federal
prison officials, the Court bifurcated the considerations and articulated a two-step
test that required a clear statement from Congress that an alternative remedial
scheme was intended to preclude a Bivens remedy. 446 U.S. 14, 18–19 (1980). In
Bush v. Lucas, the Court redefined the “special factors” standard as the balancing test
recently reaffirmed in Wilkie. 462 U.S. 367 (1983). The Lucas Court maintained a
distinction between considering the alternative remedies and the “special factors”
analysis, but the entirety of its reasoning shows that the “special factor” on which the
Court based its decision not to recognize a remedy in the absence of explicit
authorization from Congress was the existence of “an elaborate remedial system that
has been constructed step by step, with careful attention to conflicting policy
considerations.” Id. at 380–89. In Schweiker v. Chilicky, the Court folded the
alternative remedial scheme prong back into the “special factors” test, dropping the
requirement of a clear statement from Congress and defining “special factors” to
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lower courts since 9/11 have invoked special factors to justify, on
national security grounds, refusal to fashion a remedy that would
50
hold officials liable.
For aliens outside of the United States (or
subject to the entry fiction), special factors have operated as an
absolute bar, as courts have essentially crafted a new “national
51
security” component to the doctrine.
B. Qualified Immunity
Immunity is the second integral component to damages claims
52
that may reveal the underlying constitutional jurisprudence. The
doctrine of qualified immunity protects “government officials

“include an appropriate judicial deference to indications that congressional inaction
has not been inadvertent.” 487 U.S. 412, 423 (1988). Although Wilkie did not
involve a comprehensive scheme already created by Congress, the Court considered
the remedies available to the plaintiff in reaching the conclusion that “any damages
remedy for actions by Government employees who push too hard for the
Government’s benefit may come better, if at all, through legislation.” Wilkie v.
Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 562 (2007).
50
For a discussion of the “special factors” doctrine in the context of national
security cases, see Stephen I. Vladeck, National Security and Bivens After Iqbal, 14
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 255 (2010). Though agreeing with Professor Vladeck that
Bivens remains an important “national security remedy of last resort,” id. at 266, the
Author takes issue with his view that the Supreme Court’s decision in Wilkie turned
on “special factors.” Id. at 265–66. The Wilkie dissent characterized the majority
holding in that way, Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 577 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), but the majority
did not actually invoke “special factors.” Rather, the majority claimed to have
difficulty “defining a workable cause of action” for the deprivation of rights the
plaintiff suffered. Id. at 555 (majority opinion). The majority thus suggested that it
was simply making “the kind of remedial determination that is appropriate for a
common-law tribunal.” Id. at 550. “Special factors” are part of that remedial
determination but not coextensive with it.
51
See, e.g., Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009).
52
If a plaintiff successfully alleges a constitutional violation, or the court assumes
that a claim will be successful, the case falls under one of the two exceptions to
absolute immunity found in the Westfall Amendment to the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA), Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C. (2006)). Plaintiffs who are subject to these exceptions may
overcome the absolute immunity provided to the United States by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346,
2671 (2006). The case then continues against the individual defendants, and the
court must determine if the individual defendants are protected by qualified
immunity. In a suit against a federal officer as an individual, the FTCA provides for
the automatic substitution of the U.S. government as defendant if the officer was
acting within the scope of his or her employment, unless the claim alleges a violation
of the U.S. Constitution or a federal statute that provides for a private right of action.
See, e.g., In re Iraq & Afg. Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 85, 114–15 (D.D.C. 2007)
(“[T]he plaintiffs’ lawsuit is converted to one against the United States under the
Federal Tort Claims Act, in which case Rumsfeld [and other defendants] . . . shall be
dismissed as parties and the United States shall be substituted as the sole defendant .
. . .”).
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performing discretionary functions” from liability for civil damages so
long as their conduct, at the time that it occurred, did not violate any
“clearly established” constitutional or statutory rights of which a
53
reasonable person would have known.
The qualified immunity
doctrine has recently been in some flux with regard to the order in
54
which courts should decide its component prongs. Under current
Supreme Court precedent established in Pearson v. Callahan, it is not
necessary to first establish that a constitutional right exists in order to
conclude that, even if such a right existed, it would not be “clearly
55
established.” Courts may now dismiss a case on qualified immunity
grounds without first determining if the right clearly exists. Many of
the cases discussed below, however, were decided under the earlier
rule, set down in Saucier v. Katz, that existence of a right should be
56
decided before deciding whether it is “clearly established.”
C. Ancillary Doctrines: State Secrets Privilege
In several 9/11 damages cases—usually those involving
extraordinary rendition—the government has successfully used the
57
state secrets doctrine to bring about dismissals.
Specific to civil
litigation, the state secrets doctrine is an evidentiary privilege that the
government may assert in order to protect information deemed
important to national security. The law is currently unsettled as to
whether the privilege may apply only to discrete pieces of evidence or
may apply broadly, as a jurisdictional bar, to force dismissal of entire
lawsuits. Whether held to be broad or narrow, the state secrets
58
privilege is absolute and not subject to judicial balancing.
53

See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Qualified immunity is an
affirmative defense. See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). Once the
defendant pleads qualified immunity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that
the right allegedly violated was “clearly established” at the time the conduct at issue
occurred. Qualified Immunity is intended to provide “immunity from suit rather
than a mere defense from liability.” Mitchell v. Forsythe, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
A denial of qualified immunity may be immediately certified for interlocutory
appeal. Id. at 530.
54
See Pearson v. Callahan 555 U.S. 223, 237 (2009)(“There are cases in which it is
plain that a constitutional right is not clearly established but far from obvious
whether in fact there is such a right.”).
55
Id.
56
See, e.g., Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 274 n.9 (2006) (stating that
qualified immunity arguments “will be considered, as necessary, only after the
underlying constitutional questions have been addressed”).
57
See, e.g., El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 302 (4th Cir 2007).
58
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 (1953) (“[E]ven the most compelling
necessity cannot overcome the claim of privilege if the court is ultimately satisfied
that military secrets are at stake.”).
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III. THE 9/11 DAMAGES CASES
In the 9/11 damages cases, courts have appeared reluctant to
abandon the continuum of rights implicit in the constitutional
territoriality doctrine, especially in light of a highly controversial
59
cause of action, such as Bivens. The details of a number of these
cases are well-known in isolation, but reviewing them side-by-side
throws the continuum of rights into particular relief. This Part
divides the 9/11 damages cases into three categories—first, cases
brought by U.S. citizens; second, cases brought by legal, illegal, or
inadmissible aliens, when the injuries occurred or were initiated in
the United States; and third, cases brought by aliens when the
injuries occurred outside the United States. The litigation in a
number of these cases had not run its course when the Supreme
Court decided Boumediene and a few cases were reconsidered in light
of that decision. Boumediene has had no appreciable effect, except
perhaps in making it easier to deny rights to U.S. citizens injured in
locations outside the United States.
A. U.S. Citizens
Citizenship is not a guarantor of recovery, but citizen status
means that courts generally have not engaged in a protracted analysis
before concluding that claimants have constitutional rights to assert.
The rights to be free from torture and arbitrary detention are at the
core of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution. Nonetheless, it is
surprising that special factors have not weighed more heavily even in
these cases.
1.

Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd

Abdullah Al-Kidd is a U.S. citizen and Muslim convert who was
arrested at Dulles International Airport as he waited to board a plane
60
to Saudi Arabia. He was subsequently detained under the material
61
witness statute in 2003. After his arrest, Al-Kidd was held in custody

59

See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011).
Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 951 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted 131 S. Ct.
415 (2010), rev’d 131 S. Ct. 2074. Al-Kidd was not charged with a crime, but the
government alleged that he possessed “information germane” to the case against
another individual, Sami Omar Al-Hussayen (indicted for visa fraud and making false
statements to U.S. officials), and that this information would be “crucial to the
prosecution” of Al-Hussayen. Id. at 953.
61
Id. at 952; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2006).
60
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for sixteen days, during which time he was held at several highsecurity federal prison facilities, placed in cells lit twenty-four hours a
day, strip searched repeatedly, and allowed out of his cell for only
62
one to two hours a day. Al-Kidd alleged that the government never
intended to subpoena him as a material witness—and in any event he
was never called as a witness—and that the material witness statute
63
had been used as a pretext for holding him preventatively.
He
brought suit against Attorney General John Ashcroft and a number of
64
lower-level officials.
The district court held that none of the
defendants were protected by qualified immunity; Ashcroft was the
65
only defendant who appealed the denial, losing in the Ninth Circuit.
Al-Kidd’s right to bring a Bivens action was never in question, and he
66
eventually settled with lower level officials. His case against Ashcroft
reached the Supreme Court and was reversed on qualified immunity
grounds, though it appears that the outcome might have been
different had Al-Kidd, on the appeal, challenged the constitutionality
67
of his seizure. In the course of the litigation, Al-Kidd’s right to
travel was restricted, his marriage fell apart, and he was unable to find
68
employment.
2.

Padilla v. Yoo

In two cases raising more complicated national security
questions, Jose Padilla brought a number of Bivens and other claims
related to his incommunicado detention in the United States as an

62

Al-Kidd, 580 F.3d at 953. Even after he was released from detention, by court
order, he had to surrender his passport, restrict his domestic travel to three states,
and consent to home visits for a supervisory period of almost a year. Id.
63
Id. at 982–83.
64
Id. at 955.
65
Id. at 956.
66
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, ALLIANCE FOR JUST., http://www.afj.org/connect-with-theissues/the-corporate-court/ashcroft-v-al-Kidd.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2011). AlKidd eventually settled with the wardens of the various facilities where he had been
held, for a combination of monetary and institutional reforms. Abdullah al-Kidd v.
John Ashcroft, et al., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Mar. 4, 2011),
http://www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights-national-security/abdullah-al-Kidd-v-johnashcroft-et-al.
67
Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083 (2011) (“Because al-Kidd concedes
that individualized suspicion supported the issuance of the material-witness arrest
warrant; and does not assert that his arrest would have been unconstitutional absent
the alleged pretextual use of the warrant; we find no Fourth Amendment
violation.”).
68
See Al-Kidd, 580 F.3d at 952–53.
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69

“enemy combatant.” After being apprehended at Chicago O’Hare
airport as he sought to enter the United States, allegedly to detonate
70
a dirty bomb in a major American city, Padilla was indicted on
material support to terrorism charges and was eventually convicted
71
for a number of offenses connected to an unrelated alleged plot.
After his initial arrest, Padilla was transferred to a military brig where,
for two years, he was allegedly denied access to a lawyer, held
incommunicado, and subjected to “enhanced interrogation
techniques.”
While serving his criminal sentence, he filed, along with his
mother, two damages suits alleging a number of constitutional
violations, one against Donald Rumsfeld and other military
72
defendants in South Carolina and another in California against
former Bush administration lawyer John Yoo, the Office of Legal
Counsel lawyer who allegedly designed and implemented the
73
enhanced interrogation policy. In his defense, Yoo relied primarily
74
on the special factors and qualified immunity. In a well-reasoned
opinion, the district court rejected the contention that national
security should be considered a special factor and noted that Yoo had
construed the special factors doctrine so as to make it tantamount to
the state secrets privilege, which can only be asserted by the
75
government itself.
Yoo immediately appealed the qualified
76
immunity holding as of right. On appeal, the U.S. government did
not formally intervene in the case and did not assert the state secrets
defense. Rather, supporting Yoo, the government as amicus curiae,
urged the court to dismiss the case based on the special factors of
69

Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 764 F.Supp.2d 787 (D.S.C. 2011); Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F.
Supp. 2d 1005, 1034 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
70
Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1012–13. According to Attorney General John
Ashcroft, “[i]n apprehending Al Muhajir [Padilla’s alleged Muslim name,] as he
sought entry into the United States, [the government] ha[s] disrupted an unfolding
terrorist plot to attack the United States by exploding a radioactive ‘“dirty bomb.’”
Ashcroft Statement on ‘Dirty Bomb’ Suspect, CNN (June 2, 2002),
http://articles.cnn.com/2002-06-10/us/ashcroft.announcement_1_dirty-bombabdullah-al-muhajir-al-qaeda-officials?_s=PM:US.
71
Jenny S. Martinez, The Real Verdict on Jose Padilla, WASH. POST., Aug. 17, 2007, at
A23.
72
Lebron, 764 F. Supp. 2d 787.
73
Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1014. Padilla alleged that he was subjected to
twenty-five separate techniques. Id. at 1013–14.
74
See id. at 1025–26.
75
Id. at 1028–29.
76
Civil Appeals Docketing Statement at 1, Padilla v. Yoo, No. 09-16478 (9th Cir.
July 24, 2009).
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77

national security and foreign affairs. The case in South Carolina was
dismissed on special factors and qualified immunity, among other
78
grounds.
3.

Vance v. Rumsfeld and Kar v. Rumsfeld

A pair of recent cases deal with the unusual circumstances of
American citizens held, incommunicado, in military custody outside
of the United States and subjected to abusive treatment and
enhanced interrogation techniques. The earlier of these cases, Kar v.
Rumsfeld, involved a U.S. citizen who was in Iraq to make a
documentary and was taken into custody by the U.S. military after a
taxi he had hired was searched at a checkpoint and found to contain
79
materials that could be used to make roadside explosives. Kar was
held for a short time in an “outdoor cage” in Iraq’s “sweltering heat,”
slammed against a wall in Abu Ghraib, held for seven weeks in solitary
confinement at Camp Cropper in a room without a sink or a toilet,
80
and denied access to a lawyer. The district court found that Kar had
made out a Fourth Amendment claim that he was unlawfully denied a
probable cause hearing; nevertheless, it held that “his rights were not
81
clearly established ‘in light of the specific context of the case.’”
Vance v. Rumsfeld involved two American citizens working for a
82
private Iraqi security firm, Shield Group Security (SGS). Donald
Vance and Nathan Ertel became suspicious that the firm was involved
in selling arms to insurgents and made their suspicions known to the
83
FBI. After SGS became distrustful of the two and took away their
access cards, the two had to be forcibly removed from the SGS
84
compound by U.S. forces. Thereafter, they were taken into U.S.
custody and held in several U.S. military compounds, subjected to
harsh detention conditions and coercive interrogation tactics, and
denied access to a lawyer until their release was ultimately
85
authorized. The abuses they alleged were typical of suspects held in

77
Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant at 2–4, 24,
Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (9th Cir. 2009)(No. 09-16478).
78
See Lebron, 764 F. Supp. 2d 787.
79
580 F. Supp. 2d 80, 81–82 (D.D.C. 2008).
80
Id. at 82.
81
Id. at 83 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)).
82
No. 10-1687, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 16338 (7th Cir. Aug. 8, 2011).
83
Id. at *7.
84
Id. at *9.
85
Vance v. Rumsfeld, 694 F. Supp. 2d 957, 959–60 (2010), aff’d 2011 App. LEXIS
16338 (7th Cir. Aug. 8, 2011).
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war on terrorism operations: “threats of violence and actual violence,
sleep deprivation and alteration, extremes of temperature, extremes
of sound, light manipulation, threats of indefinite detention, denial
of food, denial of water, denial of medical care, yelling, prolonged,
solitary confinement, incommunicado detention, falsified allegations,
86
and other psychologically-disruptive and injurious techniques.” The
district court held that the plaintiffs’ allegations were sufficient to
survive Rumsfeld’s motion to dismiss on qualified immunity and lack
87
of personal involvement grounds. The court cited Kar in stating
that “American citizens do not forfeit their core constitutional rights
when they leave the United States, even when their destination is a
88
foreign war zone.” The Seventh Circuit distinguished Boumediene as
89
dealing with procedural due process only and affirmed most of the
district court’s opinion in a decision holding that “[t]he wrongdoing
alleged here violates the most basic terms of the constitutional
90
compact between our government and the citizens of this country.”
B. Illegal and Inadmissible Aliens in U.S. Territory
An intermediate category includes non-citizens who were
physically present in the United States at the time they were taken
into custody. For the purposes of this Article, legal, illegal, and
inadmissible aliens will be grouped together in a single category that,
it should be recognized at the outset, is broad and heterogeneous in
terms of status.
1.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal

Ashcroft v. Iqbal culminated an action yielding some damages for
91
two illegal aliens. Iqbal involved a Pakistani citizen who was living in
86

Id. at 961.
Id. at 978.
88
Id. at 970 (citing Kar v. Rumsfeld, 580 F. Supp. 2d 80 (2008)).
89
Vance, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 16338, at *55 (“Those procedural issues are
undoubtedly difficult. But they shed no useful light on how a reasonable federal
official might have thought that the Constitution permitted him to torture, or to
authorize the torture of, a civilian U.S. citizen.”).
90
Id. at *41.
91
129 S. Ct. 1937(2009). This case is better known for heightening the pleading
standard for all civil actions under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
After the Supreme Court’s decision, Iqbal settled his claims against the remaining
defendants. See Stipulation Withdrawing Appeal from Active Consideration, Iqbal v.
Hasty, 490 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2007) (No. 05-5768-cv). At the district court level, the
case name was Elmaghraby v. Aschroft, No. 04-CV-1809, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21434,
at *1 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005). Co-plaintiff Elmaghraby settled his claim for
$300,000 and was not part of the Supreme Court appeal. Brief for Respondent
87
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the United States on 9/11, allegedly with fraudulent immigration
92
papers. In the domestic sweeps after 9/11, Javaid Iqbal was picked
up and detained in the maximum security section of the
93
Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, New York During his
detention, Iqbal was allegedly kept in lockdown twenty-four hours a
day, kicked and dragged across his cell, subjected to serial strip and
cavity searches, not allowed to pray, and subjected to other alleged
94
abuses.
Iqbal sued several lower-level officials, former Attorney
General John Ashcroft, and former FBI Director Robert Mueller for
95
various violations of his constitutional rights.
2.

Arar v. Ashcroft
96

Arar v. Ashcroft is perhaps the most troubling of all the 9/11
damages cases, because the plaintiff—Syrian-Canadian Mahar Arar—
was physically present in the United States when the chain of events
97
giving rise to his claims began. After being wrongly informed by
Canadian authorities that Arar was an “Islamic extremist” and the
98
“target,” or “principal subject,” of a terrorism investigation, U.S.
authorities apprehended Arar when he was in transit to Canada from
North Africa, where he had been vacationing, took him into U.S.
custody, declared him inadmissible to the United States because of
alleged membership in Al Qaeda, and initiated deportation
99
proceedings to Syria, a country notorious for its use of torture.
Javaid Iqbal at 39, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) (No. 07-1015); see also
Nina Bernstein, U.S. Is Settling Detainee’s Suit in 9/11 Sweep, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2006,
at A1 (reporting on the case details and the settlement amount).
92
Elmaghraby, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21434, at *2–3.
93
Id.
94
Id. at *16–17.
95
Iqbal claimed that Ashcroft and Mueller were liable for, respectively,
“unconstitutionally designating him as “a person of high interest” on the basis of
“race, religion, or national origin” and for designing and implementing the
restrictive confinement-conditions policy and knowing of and condoning the abuse.
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1944 (2009).
96
414 F. Supp. 2d 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 532 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d en
banc, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010).
97
Arar had also lived for some time in the United States as a legal alien. 2
COMM’N INQUIRY INTO THE ACTIONS OF CANADIAN OFFICIALS IN RELATION TO MAHER
ARAR, REPORT OF THE EVENTS RELATING TO MAHER ARAR: FACTUAL BACKGROUND 817
(2006), available at http://www.sirc-csars.gc.ca/pdfs/cm_arar_bgv2-eng.pdf.
98
COMM’N INQUIRY INTO THE ACTIONS OF CANADIAN OFFICIALS IN RELATION TO
MAHER ARAR, REPORT OF THE EVENTS RELATING TO MAHER ARAR: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 24–25, available at http://www.sirc-csars.gc.ca/pdfs/cm_arar_receng.pdf#53.
99
Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 253–54.
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Immigration officials then deported him to Syria without informing
100
his lawyers. For ten months, Syrian authorities kept Arar in a “grave
cell,” 6 feet long by 7 feet high and 3 feet wide, where he was exposed
to dampness and cold, denied sanitary facilities, and given hardly
102
101
edible food. In these conditions, Arar lost forty pounds. The cell
103
was infested with rats and occasionally used as a toilet by stray cats.
His captors beat him with two-inch thick electric cables on his palms,
104
They also
hips, and lower back, as well as just using their fists.
allegedly confined him in a room where he could overhear the
105
screams of other detainees being tortured.
According to the
district court, the question whether Arar possessed substantive rights
106
under the Due Process Clause was a close one. The court, however,
107
decided, on special factors grounds, that national security and
108
foreign policy considerations foreclosed Arar’s claims. Though the
109
U.S. government asserted the state secrets privilege, it did not

100

Id. at 254. Arar asserted one claim under the Torture Victims Protection Act
and three claims under the U.S. Constitution. See Complaint and Demand for Jury
Trial, Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2006)(No. cv-04-0249), available
at http://ccrjustice.org/v2/legal/september_11th/docs/ArarComplaint.pdf.
101
Id. ¶ 58.
102
Id. ¶ 59.
103
Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 254.
104
Id. at 255.
105
Id.
106
Id. at 279.
107
Id. (“Assuming, without resolving, the existence of some substantive
protection, Arar’s claims are foreclosed under an exception to the Bivens doctrine.”).
108
Judge Trager also found that Arar’s rendition claims were foreclosed by special
factors because Congress was better suited than the courts to fashion a remedy
tailored to Arar’s circumstances. Id. at 281–83. Judge Trager relied on Bush v. Lucas
for the proposition that “courts will refrain from extending a Bivens claim if doing so
trammels upon matters best decided by coordinate branches of government.” 414 F.
Supp. 2d 250, 279 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (quoting Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 380
(1983)).
109
The U.S. government submitted a notice of filing and affidavits by Acting
Attorney James B. Comey and Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security
Tom Ridge formally asserted the privilege, and then moved to dismiss the case under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. See Memorandum in Support of the United
States’ Assertion of State Secrets Privilege, Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250
(E.D.N.Y. 2005) (No. 04-CV-249). It is curious that the U.S. government did not
formally intervene in the case. Plaintiff’s attorney, Center for Constitutional Rights’
lawyer Maria LaHood, in a personal communication with the Author, noted that the
complaint asked for injunctive relief, so the defendants were sued in their official
capacity and thus the U.S. government was already de facto in the suit.

WILSON_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

DAMAGES OR NOTHING

11/16/2011 2:42 PM

1509

formally intervene in the case, and the state secrets issue was never
110
reached by the court.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the
111
district court’s opinion twice—once in a three-judge panel and
112
The en banc decision did not reach the qualified
again en banc.
113
immunity defense or the state secrets privilege,
but focused
primarily on special factors and whether Arar had a viable Bivens
114
claim in view of the national security interests at stake. Referring to
the Supreme Court’s injunction in Malesko that Bivens not be
extended to new contexts, the majority first noted that ‘“[c]ontext is
not defined in the case law” and then elected to construe the term “as
it is commonly used in law: to reflect a potentially recurring scenario
that has similar legal and factual components.” Based on that
115
definition, the court concluded that rendition was a “new context.”
Judge Sack’s dissent correctly noted that the majority could only
reach this conclusion by severing the domestic facts in Arar’s
complaint from the international ones and then dismissing them as
116
insufficiently pled.
C. Aliens Abroad
The damages cases of aliens abroad can be grouped in two ways.
First, geographically—those based on acts occurring in Guantánamo
versus those based on acts occurring outside Guantánamo. Second,
administratively—those involving the military versus those involving
the Central Intelligence Agency.
1.

Guantánamo

i.

Rasul v. Myers

The interests of four British men led to the filing of Rasul v.
117
Rumsfeld. The plaintiffs alleged that while detained in Guantánamo
110

Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 287 (explaining it was not necessary to reach the state
secrets issue because the case could be decided on constitutional and statutory
grounds).
111
Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157, 162 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d en banc, 585 F.3d 559
(2d Cir. 2009).
112
Arar, 585 F.3d at 559.
113
Id. at 563.
114
Id. at 574.
115
Id. at 572; Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 74 (2001).
116
Id. at 582–83 (J. Sack, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
117
414 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C. 2006), aff’d sub nom. Rasul v. Myers, 512 F.3d 644
(D.C. Cir. 2008), vacated, 555 U.S. 1083 (2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 563 F.3d 527
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they were subjected to repeated beatings and anal probes, that they
were deprived of sleep, shackled for hours, held incommunicado,
injected with unknown substances, and, perhaps most grievously,
harassed and humiliated as they attempted to practice their
118
religion. They brought seven causes of action, including two under
the U.S. Constitution (Fifth and the Eighth Amendments) and one
119
under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).
Thus far, Rasul plaintiffs have had the most success of all the
9/11 damages cases involving alien plaintiffs held outside U.S.
sovereign territory. The reason for this success is that the RFRA
120
explicitly provides for a private right of action and by its terms is not
geographically limited. While the plaintiffs’ other claims suffered the
121
usual fate of dismissal on territorial grounds, Judge Urbina of the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia issued a separate
opinion on the RFRA claim alone, finding the RFRA applied to
Guantánamo Bay, that the plaintiffs had asserted a valid cause of
122
action, and that the defendants did not have qualified immunity.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit read into the statute
123
The
an implicit limitation on the rights established by the RFRA.
subsequent unsuccessful appeals centered on the usual Bivens
question, plus the question of whether the legislature intended to
make the RFRA co-extensive with First Amendment rights or broader
124
in scope.

(D.C. Cir. 2009). Three of the men had been plaintiffs in the original Rasul v. Bush
habeas litigation in 2004. Compare Complaint, Rasul v. Rumsfeld, 414 F. Supp. 2d 26
(D.D.C. 2004) (No. 04-CV-01864) [hereinafter Complaint, Rasul I] (plaintiffs
include: Shafiq Rasul, Asif Iqbal, Rhuhel Ahmed, and Jamal Al-Harith), with
Complaint, Rasul v. Bush, No. 02-299, (D.D.C. Apr. 21, 2005).
118
Rasul, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 28–29.
119
See Complaint, Rasul I, supra note 117.
120
See id.; see also Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000b(b)(1) (2006); cf. City
of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997) (holding RFRA unconstitutional as
applied to states).
121
Rasul, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 42–44.
122
Rasul v. Rumsfeld, 433 F. Supp. 2d 58, 67-71 (D.D.C. 2006), rev’d sub nom. Rasul
v. Myers, 06-5209, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS (D.C. Cir Jan 11, 2008).
123
Rasul v. Myers, 512 F.3d 644, 671 (D.C. Cir. 2008)(holding that RFRA extends
only to the contours of the rights under First Amendment as established before the
Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) and
does not enlarge those rights), vacated, 555 U.S. 1083 (2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part, 563 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
124
Id. at 669.
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Al-Zahrani v. Rumsfeld

The plaintiffs in Al-Zahrani v. Rumsfeld were the families of two of
the three detainees who allegedly committed suicide, simultaneously,
125
in Guantánamo on July 10, 2006. In early 2009, the plaintiffs filed a
damages suit against the U.S. government, twenty-four named
defendants, including Donald Rumsfeld, and one hundred unnamed
126
military, civilian, and medical personnel. The plaintiffs’ allegations
included being presumed to be enemy combatants, being denied the
right to an attorney, and being prevented from viewing the evidence
127
against them,
in addition to being subjected to extreme
confinement and “specific methods and acts of physical and
psychological torture,” including sleep deprivation, full-body cavity
searches, beatings, verbal abuse, religious abuse—including
mandatory shaving and desecration of the Qur’an—and various other
128
abuses.
As is the case with so many other Guantánamo detainees,
129
neither of the plaintiffs’ decedents was ever charged.
In dismissing the case, the U.S. District Court for the District of
130
Columbia cited Rasul v. Myers as precedent foreclosing plaintiffs’
131
Bivens claims.
2.

Beyond Guantánamo

i.

El-Masri v. Tenet

Khaled El-Masri is a German national who was abducted while
132
vacationing in Macedonia.
Initially taken into custody in
Macedonia, he was stripped, drugged, hooded, eventually flown to
133
detained in a bleak prison known as the “Salt Pit”;
Afghanistan,
there, he was periodically interrogated and asked to confess his
134
relationship to Al Qaeda.
During his incarceration, El-Masri
protested his detention with a hunger strike; despite being fed

125

Al-Zahrani v. Rumsfeld, 684 F. Supp. 2d 103, 106 (D.D.C. 2010).
Id. at 107.
127
Id. at 106.
128
Id.
129
Id. at 107
130
Id. at 112.
131
Al-Zahrani, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 112.
132
El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 532 (E.D. Va. 2006), aff’d 479 F.3d 296
(4th Cir. 2007).
133
Id. at 533–34.
134
Id.
126
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135

forcibly, he lost sixty pounds.
CIA Director George Tenet and
National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice were advised that ElMasri’s passport was authentic and that the CIA had detained the
136
wrong man. In late May, El-Masri was flown to Albania, released on
a hill in the middle of the night, and left to make his way back to
137
Germany.
El-Masri’s complaint, filed in the District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia, alleged both constitutional and
138
international law violations. The United States immediately filed a
statement of interest and asserted a formal claim of state secrets
privilege, eventually intervening in the case and filing a motion to
139
dismiss.
The court granted the motion to dismiss—not without a
140
A threefew regretful words—based on the state secrets privilege.
judge panel of the Fourth Circuit decided the case on similar
141
142
grounds, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.
Appeals to
the U.S. Congress were similarly unavailing.
Though an innocent man at the time of his arrest, El-Masri later
suffered from the physical and emotional trauma that he had
endured and was subsequently hospitalized in a psychiatric institution
143
following his arrest on suspicion of arson.
ii.

In re Iraq and Afghanistan Detainees

In a case involving detainees held in military detention in
Afghanistan and Abu Ghraib in Iraq, plaintiffs brought constitutional
claims against Rumsfeld and other military officials alleging due
144
process violations, and cruel and unusual punishment. Reflecting a
general pattern, the abuses alleged to have occurred at military bases
in Iraq and Afghanistan are generally even more appalling than those

135

Id.
Id. at 534.
137
Id.
138
El-Masri, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 534–35.
139
Id. at 535.
140
Id. at 530. All this occurred before any discovery had taken place.
141
El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 296 (4th Cir. 2007).
142
El-Masri v. United States, 552 U.S. 947 (2007).
143
Margaret Satterthwaite, The Story of El-Masri v. Tenet: Human Rights and
Humanitarian Law in the ‘War on Terror,’ in HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY STORIES 535, 573
(Deena R. Hurwitz, et al. eds. 2009).
144
In re Iraq & Afg. Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 85, 91 (D.D.C. 2007), aff’d
sub nom. Ali v. Rumsfeld, No. 07-5178 (D.C. Cir. June 21, 2011); see also id. at 103–08
(holding special factors counsel hesitation because military affairs, foreign relations,
and national security are constitutionally committed to the political branches).
136
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145

that allegedly occurred at Guantánamo. One plaintiff alleged that
U.S. military personnel hung him to the ceiling upside-down with a
chain and proceeded to pushing and slapping him until he lost
146
consciousness.
Another alleged that he was stripped and
photographed, subjected to cavity probes, dehydrated, and subjected
147
threats of being drowned.
A third was severely beaten, stabbed,
burned, locked in severe confinement, dragged, menaced by a dog,
148
denied food and drink, and threatened with death.
The district court began its analysis with the threshold question
of whether the plaintiffs were protected by the Constitution and
quickly concluded that their claims were foreclosed by Eisentrager and
149
Verdugo-Urquidez. The plaintiffs argued that they were entitled to
“fundamental rights” under the Constitution in territories subject to
the control of the United States in accordance with the Insular
150
Cases. Even though the court found that the plaintiffs were unable
to assert any rights under the Constitution, the court went on to
examine the special factors that might counsel hesitation in rejecting
151
plaintiffs’ Bivens claim on a second, separation-of-powers ground.
The case reached the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia as
152
Ali v. Rumsfeld.
On the appeal, the plaintiffs argued that in
Boumediene the Court had “adopted a flexible approach that leaves
open the possibility of the extraterritorial application of
153
constitutional provisions other than the Suspension Clause;” but
the D.C. Court of Appeals, while casting doubt on that proposition,
chose to analyze the case under the Pearson rule and dismissed it on
qualified immunity grounds, with special factors as an alternative
154
basis.

145
See CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, REPORT ON TORTURE AND CRUEL,
INHUMAN AND DEGRADING TREATMENT AT GUANTÁNAMO BAY, CUBA 17, 24 (2006),
available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/Report_ReportOnTorture.pdf.
146
In re Iraq & Afg. Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d at 88–89.
147
Id. at 89.
148
Id.
149
Id. at 98.
150
Id. at 99.
151
Id. at 107 (citing the “hazard of such multi-various pronouncements combined
with the constitutional commitment of military and foreign affairs to the political
branches”).
152
Ali v. Rumsfeld, No. 07-5178, (D.C. Cir. June 21, 2011).
153
Id.
154
Id.
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IV. ANALYSIS
Although the heuristic is not absolutely perfect, the outcomes in
these cases largely reflect the pre-Boumediene territorial Constitution,
which ends at the “water’s edge.” The biggest differentiator is the
location of the site of injury in combination with the citizenship
status of the plaintiffs. The most successful cases have been by U.S.
citizens and U.S. resident aliens detained within the territorial United
155
States; the least successful, by aliens detained outside the territorial
156
United States.
Damage awards have resulted in those cases in which the
plaintiffs were on U.S. territory when the injuries occurred. Al-Kidd
157
and Iqbal settled their claims against lower-level officials, even
though their claims against cabinet-level officials were ultimately
158
159
dismissed. Iqbal’s co-plaintiff Elmaghraby also settled his claims.
Although one of Padilla’s damages cases was dismissed at the district
court level in South Carolina, his Ninth Circuit appeal is still going
forward, and he has appeals available to him in the South Carolina
160
case.
Arar is an apparent exception to the territorial rule; he was
initially taken into custody while physically present in the United
161
States, yet his case failed at every stage. As Judge Sack noted in
dissent, the majority artificially divided the complaint into domestic
162
claims that did not involve torture and foreign claims that did.

155
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1937 (2009); Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d
949, 949 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted 131 S. Ct. 415 (2010), rev’d 131 S. Ct. 2074
(2011).
156
See Al-Zahrani v. Rumsfeld, 684 F. Supp. 2d 103 (D.D.C. 2010); In re Iraq & Afg.
Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 85 (D.D.C. 2007), aff’d sub nom. Ali v. Rumsfeld, No.
07-5178, (D.C. Cir. June 21, 2011); Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 (E.D.N.Y.
2006), aff’d, 532 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d en banc, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009),
cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010); Rasul v. Rumsfeld, 414 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C.
2006), aff’d sub nom. Rasul v. Myers, 512 F.3d 644 (D.C. Cir. 2008), vacated, 555 U.S.
1083 (2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 563 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2009); El-Masri v.
Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 532 (E.D. Va. 2006). Furthermore, this analysis must be
qualified by noting that the cases discussed are at different procedural stages. Some
have already reached the Supreme Court. One case, Rasul v. Myers, has reached the
Supreme Court twice. See Rasul v. Myers, 130 S. Ct. 1013 (2009); Rasul v. Myers, 555
U.S. 1083 (2008).
157
See discussion supra Part III.A.1 & Part III.B.1.
158
See discussion supra Part III.A.1 & Part III.B.1.
159
See supra note 91.
160
See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
161
See discussion supra Part III.B.2.
162
Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 582–83 (2d Cir. 2009).
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The cases of aliens abroad have failed to win any compensation
163
or acknowledgement of wrong for the victim. Indeed, the Supreme
164
165
166
Court denied certiorari in El-Masri,
Rasul, and Arar, thus
leaving in place a set of highly conservative decisions that appear to
ratify, at least for the present, the new national security special factors
167
doctrine that the lower courts seem to be fleshing out.
These outcomes neither reflect the degree of innocence of the
plaintiffs, nor the extent of the injuries. While Al-Kidd appears to
have been guilty of nothing more than too fervent an interest in
Islam, Iqbal and his co-plaintiff were not in compliance with
immigration laws. Jose Padilla had an extensive criminal history,
including seventeen prior arrests, even before his alleged training
168
with Al Qaeda.
Criminality is no justification for torture, but no
principles of fairness can make sense of the results in these cases. ElMasri was a case of mistaken identity. Arar was detained on the basis
of misleading information provided by the Canadian government,
but a Canadian investigation into the matter did not find evidence
that Canadian officials had played an active part in the decision to
169
render him to Syria.
Arar received $9.75 million in compensation

163
See Al-Zahrani v. Rumsfeld, 684 F. Supp. 2d 103 (D.D.C 2010); In re Iraq & Afg.
Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 85, 91 (D.D.C. 2007); Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp.
2d 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 532 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d en banc, 585 F.3d 559
(2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010); Rasul v. Rumsfeld, 414 F. Supp. 2d
26 (D.D.C. 2006); El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 532 (E.D. Va. 2006).
164
El-Masri v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 373 (2007).
165
Rasul v. Myers, 130 S. Ct. 1013 (2009).
166
Arar v. Ashcroft,130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010).
167
Arar, 585 F.3d 559; Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 532 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(noting as an alternative ground for dismissal that “[t]he danger of obstructing U.S.
national security policy” is a special factor counseling courts to hesitate before
creating a Bivens remedy). It is possible that the Court declined to hear these cases
because it concluded that they would ultimately fail on the question of qualified
immunity. Even if the Court were willing to affirm the constitutional rights of aliens
abroad, it would be difficult to overcome the argument, under the Pearson rule, that
these rights were not clearly established when they were allegedly violated.
168
United States v. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d 1085, 1115–17(11th Cir. 2011)(noting the
government’s appeal regarding the downward departure from the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines in Padilla’s case).
169
COMM’N OF INQUIRY INTO THE ACTIONS OF CAN. OFFICIALS IN RELATION TO MAHER
ARAR, REPORT OF THE EVENTS RELATING TO MAHAR ARAR: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 14, available at http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/pcobcp/commissions/maher_arar/07-0913/www.ararcommission.ca/eng/AR_English.pdf.
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and an apology from the Canadian government, but the United States
170
has never admitted wrongdoing in his case.
These cases thus reflect a harsh rule. Citizens and U.S. resident
171
Aliens abroad—
aliens get damages from someone at some level.
even though they may have suffered appalling deprivations of liberty
172
and egregious affronts to their human dignity—get nothing.
V. CONCLUSION
In the world of damages, Boumediene changed little. The
Supreme Court denied certiorari in El-Masri before issuing its
opinion in Boumediene and denied certiorari in Arar afterwards. It
granted certiorari in Rasul before Boumediene and denied certiorari
afterwards. When it granted certiorari in Rasul, it merely vacated the
D.C. Circuit’s judgment and remanded for reconsideration in light of
173
Boumediene.
The D.C. Circuit found little in Boumediene to
reconsider and reinstated its judgment on a more limited basis. Nor
is it evident that Boumediene has had much impact on other lower
court decisions.
To some extent, Boumediene’s failure to make an impact can be
attributed to the intersection of qualified immunity with the
underlying constitutional jurisprudence. Because most of the acts
giving rise to the damages cases under discussion had occurred
before June 2008, when Boumediene was decided, it could be
concluded, that the right in question was not “clearly established” for
170
Ian Austen, Canada Will Pay $9.75 Million to Man Sent to Syria and Tortured, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 26, 2007, A1. As early as 2003, Congress requested that the Department
of Homeland Security Inspector General (DHS IG) undertake an investigation into
Arar’s case. For more than four years the final report was delayed, apparently by
Department of Justice obstructions. Scott Horton, The Missing IG Report on Maher
Arar, HARPER’S MAG. (Nov. 16, 2007), http://harpers.org/archive/2007/11/hbc90001676. When the IG report was finally released, it was heavily redacted. Scott
Horton,
More
on
Maher
Arar,
HARPER’S MAG.
(June
5,
2008),
http://harpers.org/archive/2008/06/hbc-90003043. For a redacted version of the
report,
see
Final
Copy
for
the
Hill,
HARPER’S
MAG.,
http://harpers.org/media/pdf/OIG-08-18-FinalcopyfortheHill.pdf (last visited Sept.
23, 2011).
171
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009); Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949
(9th Cir. 2009).
172
See Al-Zahrani v. Rumsfeld, 684 F. Supp. 2d 103 (D.D.C. 2010); In re Iraq & Afg.
Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 85, 91 (D.D.C. 2007), aff’d sub nom. Ali v. Rumsfeld,
No. 07-5178, (D.C. Cir. June 21, 2011); Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250
(E.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 532 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d en banc, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir.
2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010); Rasul v. Rumsfeld, 414 F. Supp. 2d 26
(D.D.C. 2006); El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 532 (E.D. Va. 2006).
173
Rasul v. Meyers, 555 U.S. 1083 (2008), vacating 512 F.3d 644.
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actions taking place outside U.S. sovereign territory. Since no court
has held thus far that constitutional rights apply beyond
Guantánamo, the impact of the qualified immunity defense is
unlikely to change in the near future.
Ironically, however, Boumediene may end up changing the scope
of qualified immunity with respect to U.S. citizens. Prior to
Boumediene, it would have been difficult for a federal official to claim
it was not “clearly established” that U.S. citizens are protected by the
U.S. Constitution when they are abroad, at least to the same extent
that they are protected by it on U.S. territory. Boumediene undermines
that conclusion and throws the qualified immunity analysis into
disarray because the reach of the Constitution now depends on the
wisdom of a court determining that it is not “impractical and
anomalous” to extend the protections of the Constitution to a U.S.
citizen if that citizen is not within the sovereign territory of the
United States. Citizenship would now seem to be only one among
several of the “Boumediene factors.”
The situation now presents the reverse of the usual case in
qualified immunity analyses. Not infrequently it happens that a court
will immunize a federal official for a violation of a right that is clearly
established at the time of the case but that was still in the process of
evolving at the time the relevant acts took place. Thus U.S. courts
have found that U.S. officials have qualified immunity for acts
committed at Guantánamo before Boumediene was decided, because
“[n]o reasonable government official would have been on notice that
plaintiffs had any Fifth Amendment or Eighth Amendment rights”
174
before the Supreme Court’s decision.
Boumediene causes the law
relating to constitutional extraterritoriality as to citizens to regress, at
least in theory, from being “clearly established” to “not clearly
established.” In October 2011, the United States asked the Seventh
Circuit to reconsider the lower court’s decision in Vance v. Rumsfeld
because of the “exceptionally important question of whether a court,
in the absence of legislative authority, may recognize a damages
action against individual government officials regarding the
detention and interrogation of military detainees in a foreign war
175
zone.” The appeal in Vance may be a harbinger.

174
Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 530 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1013
(2009).
175
Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc, at 1, Vance v.
Rumsfeld, Civ. No. 09-16478 (7th Cir. Oct. 28, 2011).

